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A History of Competition: The Impact
of Antitrust on Hong Kong’s
Telecommunications Markets
Sandra Marco Colino
Hong Kong has only had cross-sector competition law since
2015, but the city’s telecommunications markets have been subject
to sector-specific antitrust provisions for over two decades. The
importance of nurturing an efficient, innovative, and competitive
telecoms industry for Hong Kong’s economic prosperity was
acknowledged already at the time the sector was liberalized in the
1990s. Yet until the late 2000s, the government vehemently
opposed the adoption of competition law in virtually all other
sectors of the economy. This paper examines the effectiveness of
the regulatory framework set up to guarantee the protection of
competition in the telecommunications sector in Hong Kong. The
results of the liberalization process are certainly remarkable, and
the city boasts very competitive telecoms markets. However, it is
argued that the enthusiasm over the results of the liberalization
process may have eclipsed important competition issues in local
markets, which could have been tackled through the development
of a robust antitrust policy, but which were sadly left unheeded. On
the basis of the analysis of the history of (sector-specific)
competition law in the telecoms sector, this Article assesses the
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potential of the new Competition Ordinance to address the
principal threats to competition in these markets. In doing so, the
paper finds that, while the new regulatory framework may be
generally suitable to combat collusion, it is less clear that it will
effectively combat the problems associated with the creation of
market power through mergers, or the abuse of that power.
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INTRODUCTION
Hong Kong is one of the latest jurisdictions to implement a
fully-fledged competition law regime. The Hong Kong
Competition Ordinance (“CO”) has been in force since December
14, 2015,1 following an unusually lengthy three-and-a-half-year
implementation process.2 The CO may be the city’s first crosssector competition act, but it is not the first piece of antitrust law to
ever apply in this part of the world. Before 2015, two particular
industries were subject to sector-specific legislation:
telecommunications and broadcasting. In the mid-1990s, when
telecommunications markets began to be liberalized, antitrust
provisions were included in the licenses granted to telecoms
operators. Shortly afterwards, in the early 2000s, competition law
rules were added to the Telecommunications Ordinance (“TO”),3
and similar provisions were included in the Broadcasting
Ordinance (“BO”) when it was adopted that same decade.4 At the
time, a resilient hostility towards competition law reigned in Hong
Kong, despite a burgeoning clamor in favor of its adoption. Until
2007, the government categorically opposed the introduction of
comprehensive antitrust legislation, which was viewed as
incompatible with the city’s fondness of minimal market
intervention.5 The prompt embrace of competition law for
telecommunications speaks volumes of the importance given by
the Hong Kong legislator to the protection of competition in this
fundamental industry. Moreover, if there was any doubt as to the
sector’s antitrust uniqueness, the CO’s Merger Rule is currently
1

Competition Ordinance, (2015) Cap. 619 (H.K.).
During this period, the Hong Kong Competition Commission and the Hong Kong
Competition Tribunal were created. The former actively promoted various competition
advocacy initiatives, issued substantive and procedural guidelines, and published
leniency and enforcement priorities policy papers.
3
Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K–N (H.K.). The conduct
rules were added in 2000, while the merger rule was introduced in 2003.
4
Broadcasting Ordinance, (2001) Cap. 562, § 13–14 (H.K). For an analysis of this
sector, see Kelvin H. F. Kwok, Abuse of Dominance in the Hong Kong Television
Industry, in COMPETITION LAW IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS: KEY REGULATORY
CHALLENGES (Sandra Marco Colino ed., forthcoming 2019).
5
Thomas K. Cheng, A Tale of Two Competition Law Regimes—The Telecom-Sector
Competition Regulation in Hong Kong and Singapore, 30 WORLD COMPETITION L. &
ECON. REV. 501, 502 (2007).
2
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only applicable to mergers affecting telecommunications, and the
first case brought by the Hong Kong Competition Commission
(“HKCC”) before the Hong Kong Competition Tribunal
(“HKCT”) relates to the alleged bid rigging practices of various
information technology (“IT”) companies in relation to the
installation of an IT server system.6
The efforts to foster competition in this sector reflect an
understanding of the importance of nurturing a “dynamic,
innovative, efficient and competitive telecommunications industry”
for the region’s economic prosperity.7 In an increasingly
globalized world, connectivity is fundamental for both personal
and business interactions and requires the wide availability of
consistent, affordable telecommunications services. In fact, there is
a stark conviction that Hong Kong’s “coveted position as the
regional centre for tertiary and quaternary activities . . . has been
achieved through its unique mix of geographical advantages,
regulatory framework, human capital, and not least, the availability
of high quality telecommunications services at competitive
prices.”8 Yet as a network industry—that is, one requiring the
existence of a solid, widely accessible infrastructure—,9 its
markets may be inclined to depart from the model of perfect
competition and be prone to market failures: “products are
heterogeneous, differentiation in products is common, the life

6

Competition Tribunal Enforcement Action No. 1 of 2017, Notice Under Rule 19 of
the Competition Tribunal Rules, (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.comptribunal.hk
/filemanager/case/en/upload/11/CTEA1-2017(E).pdf [https://perma.cc/S7S5-QUDG]; see
also Adrian Emch, New Developments in Hong Kong’s First Case Under the
Competition Ordinance (May 9, 2018), KLUWER COMPETITION L. BLOG,
http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2018/05/09/new-developmentshong-kongs-first-case-competition-ordinance [https://perma.cc/M59G-B65V]. See infra
Section III.B.
7
OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION IN HONG
KONG’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 2 (June
2003), http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/report-paper-guide/report/rp20030620.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VHH-XSY7] [hereinafter REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
COMPETITION] (drafting of the paper completed by Spectrum Strategy Consultants).
8
Cliff Lui, Telecommunications Competition Regulation in Hong Kong 4 (2007),
http://www.viperfusion.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2007/05/telecommunications
-competition-regulation-in-hk.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J3U-W4JL] (emphasis added).
9
HANS-WERNER GOTTINGER, ECONOMIES OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 1, 4 (2003).
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cycles of products are short, sunk cost is significant, innovation is
essential. . . .”10 A reminiscence of the old legal monopolies may
be that one company retains a particularly strong market position,
which it might employ strategically to hurt competitors. Taking
into account these peculiarities, it is perhaps unsurprising that, in a
jurisdiction traditionally unswayed by the merits of exerting
legislative control over anti-competitive behavior, there was an
awareness that competition in telecommunications required
exceptional legislative attention. Such special care came in the
shape of both sector-specific regulation and sector-specific
competition law provisions. The regulation-antitrust interplay is
not uncommon in network industries, since it can be difficult to
achieve competition by relying solely on market forces: what is
efficient may not always socially desirable, and social and private
benefits do not necessarily coincide.11 As a consequence, industryfocused competition law provisions were seen as a necessary
complement to the sectoral regulation that formed the backbone of
a liberalization policy aimed at promoting competitive
telecommunications markets.
This paper assesses the effectiveness of the regulatory
framework set up to guarantee the protection of competition in the
telecommunications sector in Hong Kong. Through various
initiatives and reforms implemented in the past couple of decades,
the markets have indeed been progressively liberalized, and with
remarkable achievements. They are among the most competitive
telecom markets in the world, with a high number of competitors,
low market concentration ratios, impressive penetration rates,
reasonable prices, and outstanding quality and reliability.12 Yet the
enthusiasm over the results of the liberalization process may have
served to eclipse important issues that could have, at least in part,
been tackled through the development of a robust antitrust policy.
It is often overlooked that competitiveness and market competition
are two different issues: while the figures usually cited as a
10

Id. at 1.
Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction,
in THE NEW ECONOMY AND BEYOND: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 96, 97 (Dennis W.
Jansen ed., 2006).
12
See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text; see also supra Section I.B.
11
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testament to the achievements may be a good indicator of the
former, they do not necessarily reflect accurately on the latter.
Rivalry ought to put pressure on market players to compete, but it
does not rule out the existence of market power—held either
individually or collectively—with the potential to threaten the
proper functioning of the market.13 And the fact remains that the
profits that may be reaped from anti-competitive behavior are too
tempting to be ignored. Unfortunately, when problems have been
identified in Hong Kong, thus far the reaction of the relevant
authorities has been disappointing at best, downright deficient at
worst. In this context, the question arises as to whether the
shortcomings have been a consequence of the existence of intrinsic
limitations within the sector-specific competition provisions that
were applicable to the industry until 2015, or if they can instead be
attributed to a flawed enforcement policy. The present study
reflects on the potential of the new cross-sector competition
legislation to foster a more vigorous antitrust strategy.
In order to explore these fundamental issues, the paper looks at
the four principal telecoms markets: domestic and international
fixed telephone network services, mobile telephony, and data
(Internet) access. The second part provides an overview of the
history of liberalization of the Hong Kong telecom industry and the
results of the process on each of those markets. The third part
covers the sector-specific legislative framework and its practical
application. Thereafter, the fourth part considers the impact of the
CO on the effectiveness of the protection of competition in the
industry. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the fifth and final part.
I. THE LIBERALIZATION OF HONG KONG’S TELECOMS MARKETS
The narrative of the evolution of competition in the Hong Kong
telecommunications sector is often presented as a major success
story. According to the Office of the Communications Authority
(“OFCA”), the executive arm of the current telecoms regulator, the
region boasts “one of the most sophisticated and successful

13
On the risks of market power, see Sandra Marco Colino, The Antitrust F Word:
Fairness Considerations in Competition Law, J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2019).
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telecommunications markets in the world,” a feature that has been
crucial for its “development as a leading business and financial
centre.”14 The most recent figures reflect a gross output of HKD 93
billion for the industry, which employs over 20,000 people.15 The
government frequently brags about the city’s position as “a leading
market in terms of effectiveness of competition in
telecommunications.”16 However, the conditions for competition to
thrive did not exist until the telecoms markets were liberalized
through a series of regulatory initiatives launched mainly in the
1990s and 2000s. Liberalization was propelled by the convergence
of two principal factors: first, the external pressure of global
developments and the international obligations assumed by the
government; second, an internal force, based on the growing
conviction that heralding a competitive telecommunications
industry was a must. The latter factor also led to the adoption of
competition legislation, initially specific to telecommunications
and eventually applicable to all sectors. This part of the paper
focuses on the liberalization process. The implementation of
competition law in the liberalized markets is addressed in the
following part.
A. How the Telecoms Markets Progressively Opened Up to
Competition
In 1994, the government ratified the Marrakesh Agreement,
which established the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).17 Hong
Kong is thus a founding WTO member, and it was a party to the
General Agreement on Trades and Services (“GATS”) when it
entered into force in January 1995. The GATS constituted a
multilateral effort to liberalize trade in services, including
14

OFFICE OF THE COMMC’NS AUTH., TELECOMMUNICATIONS 2 (Dec. 2018), https://
www.ofca.gov.hk/filemanager/ofca/en/content_113/telecommunications.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TR9L-G2N9] [hereinafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS 2018].
15
Id.
16
Press Release, Office of the Telecommunications Authority, Study Finds Hong
Kong a Competitive Telecommunications Market (June 20, 2003), http://
www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/brandhk/0620245.htm [https://perma.cc/2FGQ-KFD6].
17
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201867
/volume-1867-I-31874-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QDM-Z52Q].
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telecommunications.18 Annexed to the GATS in a Protocol was the
WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services
(“BTSA”),19 to be implemented by 1998, by virtue of which the
signatories committed to opening up their telecommunications
services. The principal objective of the BTSA was to ensure
reasonable, non-discriminatory access to telecommunications
markets for service providers, equipment manufacturers, and
vendors alike.20 In this context, Hong Kong was forced to take the
necessary measures to ensure that any telecommunications markets
that were not fully liberalized progressively opened up to
competition.
Already a year before signing the WTO Agreement, the Office
of the Telecommunications Authority (“OFTA”) was set up as the
executive arm of the former Hong Kong telecom watchdog, the
Telecommunications Authority (“TA”).21 Vested with regulatory
powers and entrusted with the task of enforcing competition in the
telecommunications sector, the OFTA implemented and oversaw
the liberalization process. Given that the TO, which has regulated
the local telecom markets since 1963,22 requires a license to offer
telecom services in Hong Kong,23 the first fundamental step
towards liberalization necessarily had to imply awarding licenses
to new operators. The first market in which liberalizing measures
were implemented was that of local fixed telephone network

18

Heidi Ullrich, Assessing the Interaction Between Multiple Levels of Rule-Making in
Trade in Telecommunications Services, CSGR CIGI UNU-CRIS ANNUAL CONFERENCE
(2005),
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/csgr-events
/conferences/2005_conferences/8_annual_conference/ulrich.doc [https://perma.cc/2ZSC52K8].
19
Laura B. Sherman, World Trade Organization: Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in
Services), 36 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 354, 354 (1997).
20
For a brief summary of the content of the BTSA, see M. Fredebeul-Krein & A.
Freytag, Telecommunications and WTO Discipline. An assessment of the WTO
Agreement on Telecommunication Services, 21 TELECOMM. POL’Y 447, 478–83 (1997).
21
See About Us, OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk
/en/aboutOFTA/main.html [https://perma.cc/NUF6-VKXS] (last revised Feb. 19, 2010).
22
Although the TO’s competition provisions have now been replaced by the CO, the
rest of the TO remains in force. Compare Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap.
106, § 8 (H.K.), with Competition Ordinance, (2015) Cap. 619 (H.K.).
23
Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 8 (H.K.).
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services (“FTNS”). The company Cable & Wireless Hong Kong
Telecommunications Limited (which would later become HKT
Limited, a subsidiary of PCCW since 2000) had a monopoly over
the domestic sector until 1995. That year, the OFTA started issuing
additional FTNS licenses. By 2003, the market was fully
liberalized24 and as of 2018, there were twenty-seven fixed
network operators providing local services.25
External telecommunications took a little longer to open up.
Hong Kong Telecom International (“HKTI”) was granted an
exclusive license until 2006, which gave the company exclusive
rights over fundamental external services, including voice
telephony and international direct dial (“IDD”) calls.26 However,
pressure was mounting on the Hong Kong government to honor the
obligations it had assumed under the GATS and the BTSA. In
addition, a 1991 study by Milton Mueller recommended ending
HKTI’s privileges after showing that it was using the profits it
made in the international services to cross-subsidize local calls.27
Eventually, the government and HKTI agreed on the early
termination of the exclusive rights. The international
telecommunications services market was thus liberalized in 1999
and a year later, the international circuits and facilities market
followed suit.28 Currently, a plethora of international FTNS
licensees operate through both cable and satellite. By 2016, there
were 266 providers of external telecommunications services
(“ETS”)29 and in 2017, the total capacity of external
telecommunications facilities reached almost 53,000 Gigabits per
24

Bus. Monitor Int’l, Hong Kong Telecommunications Report Q4 2011 88 (2011).
Key Communications Statistics, OFF. COMM. AUTH., https://www.ofca.gov.hk
/en/media_focus/data_statistics/key_stat/index.html [https://perma.cc/AZ7H-KD2H] (last
modified Jan. 16, 2019).
26
IDDs are international calls which can be placed directly by dialling a country code.
Liberalisation of Hong Kong’s External Telecommunications—A Policy Statement,
ECON. SERVS. BUREAU, at 2 (Jan. 20, 1998), http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/esb
/980120/pl120e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MHW-83QP].
27
See MILTON MUELLER, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HONG KONG: THE
CASE FOR LIBERALIZATION 55, 94 (Chinese Univ. Press ed. 1992) (1991).
28
OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., supra note 7, at 14.
29
Telecommunications,
OFF.
COMM.
AUTH.,
at
2
(June
2016),
https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/telecommunications.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5ZF-TMYC].
25
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second (“Gbps”). Market concentration is currently low in both the
local and international fixed telephony sectors, and there is no
dominant undertaking in either environment.
The mobile telephony market has been fully liberalized since
the government refrained from setting a cap on the number of
licenses to be assigned or on the level of foreign investment.30
Three licenses were issued as far back as 1984 with a another six
personal communications services (“PCS”) licenses granted in
1996.31 In 2001, third generation (“3G”) wireless mobile
telecommunications technology licenses were allotted by the
OFTA and subsequently the market opened up to fourth generation
(“4G”) services, to the extent that it is now almost entirely 3G/4G
enabled.32 By 2020, the fifth generation (“5G”) era is expected to
begin. By 2021, further expansion is anticipated with the
expiration of the fifteen-year licenses over certain spectrums.33 The
government plans to re-assign around sixty percent of the spectrum
through auction, and Chinese operators are expected to bid and
possibly enter the market.34 There are currently four major mobile
telephony operators serving 7.43 million people. As of December
2017, the number of subscribers was around seventeen million
with a penetration rate of 247.5 percent—among the highest in the
world.35 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”), which
30

Arrangements for the Frequency Spectrum in the 1.9–2.2 GHz Band upon Expiry of
the Existing Frequency Assignments for the Provision of 3G Mobile Services and the
Spectrum Utilization Fee, OFF. OF COMM. AUTH., at 2 (Jan. 13, 2014),
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/itb/papers/itb0113cb4-292-1-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KME6-W5LL].
31
OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., supra note 7, at 9. PCS are defined as “[d]igital mobile
service[s] which generally operate[] in the 1800–1900 MHz bands.” They rely on
technology such Time Division Multiple Access (“TDMA”), Code Division Multiple
Access (“CDMA”) and Global System for Mobile (“GSM”). Id. at 31.
32
Office of the Telecomms. Auth., Report on the Effectiveness of Competition in
Hong Kong’s Telecommunications Market in 2005: An International Comparison 24
(Spectrum Strategy Consultants 2005), http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/report-paperguide/report/rp20051229.pdf [https://perma.cc/F23T-ZE4T].
33
DBS VICKERS (H.K.) LTD., HONG KONG TELECOM SECTOR 2 (Apr. 25, 2017)
https://www.dbs.com/aics/pdfController.page?pdfpath=/content/article/pdf/AIO/042017/
170425_insights_cautious_on_hk_mobile_market.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8YL-9QML].
34
Id. at 3.
35
See Arrangements for Assignment of the Spectrum in the 3.4–3.6 GHz Band for the
Provision of Public Mobile Services and the Related Spectrum Utilisation Fee, COM.
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measures market concentration by adding up the squared market
shares of the various players, is among the lowest of developed
economies,36 and no company holds a market share of more than
thirty percent.37 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Hong Kong
would have the “most affordable mobile and fixed telecom
services” in the OECD.38
With regard to data access, commercial Internet service
providers (“ISPs”) entered the market in 1993, only two years after
the first Internet connection for the intra-city traffic, the Hong
Kong Internet eXchange (“HKIX”) was established at the Chinese
University of Hong Kong. At the time of writing, there were about
250 ISPs39 operating in a city that boasts some of the region’s most
sophisticated computer installations.40 Broadband is available in
virtually all of the city’s residential and commercial buildings. Up
to 2.64 million registered users—equivalent to ninety-two percent
of households—have residential broadband connection with speeds
of up to ten Gbps. However, there are just four principal providers
of home broadband services. The incumbent PCCW-HKT holds as
much as sixty percent of the market,41 and the only other
competitor with a strong presence is Hong Kong Broadband
Network (“HKBN”), with a market share of just over twenty-two
percent.42 Besides broadband, the population may connect to the
Internet through over ten thousand public wireless fidelity
(“WiFi”) hotspots.43 Indeed, recent figures point to a high level of

ECON. DEV. BUREAU & OFF. COMM. AUTH. (May 2, 2018), https://www.comsauth.hk/filemanager/en/content_711/cp20180502.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8TF-Q5C9].
36
Cheng, supra note 5, at 504.
37
Id.
38
YUN ZHAO, CYBER LAW IN HONG KONG 26 (2d ed. 2011).
39
List of Internet Service Providers (ISP), OFF. OF COMM. AUTH.,
https://www.ofca.gov.hk/en/data_statistics/data_statistics/internet/list_of_internet_service
_providers [https://perma.cc/DDW8-R2KT] (last modified Feb. 1, 2019).
40
ZHAO, supra note 38, at 26.
41
Anthea Lai & Sam Cheung, Hong Kong’s Next Twenty Years, BLOOMBERG PROF’L
SERVS. fig.2 (June 9, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/hong-kongsnext-20-years-telecom [https://perma.cc/DEQ4-KE3B].
42
Hong Kong Telecom Sector, DBS VICKERS (H.K.) LTD., at 5 fig.4 (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.dbs.com/aics/templatedata/article/industry/data/en/GR/042016/telecommuni
cations_honglong.xml [https://perma.cc/3FKP-54SQ].
43
ZHAO, supra note 38, at 27.
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mobile internet usage. Almost half of the population connects with
their phones more frequently than their computers,44 and about
seventy percent of the population is in possession of a
smartphone.45 It should thus come as no surprise that research
conducted by the Society for Consumer Research (“GfK”)46 shows
that Hong Kong remains the world’s most connected place.47 This
reputation is further enhanced by the growth of connecting
wearables such as smart watches, described as the “in thing” of the
late 2010s, and of connected cars.48
B. The Regulatory Framework that Enabled Liberalization
The above insights into the liberalization process of the
principal telecoms markets show that, in order to open up regulated
industries to competition, it is necessary to first do away with any
existing limitations on the obtaining of licenses to provide the
relevant services. To this end, since the 1990s, “[t]here is no preset limit on the number of licenses issued [to operate in Hong
Kong’s telecom markets], nor deadline for applications.
Furthermore, there is no specific requirement on network rollout or
investment. The level of investment is determined by the
market.”49 Even then, the license system is not considered to be the

44

See Dustin Sodano, Nearly Seven in 10 Hong Kong Residents Use Smartphones,
(Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Nearly-Seven-10-HongKong-Residents-Use-Smartphones/1014941 [https://perma.cc/2M3G-PAPD].
45
Id.
46
The abbreviation derives from the German name of the Society, Gesellschaft für
Konsumforschung.
47
Jamie Carter, Hong Kong Still the World’s Most Connected Place; Singapore Not
Even in Top 10, SO. CHINA MORNING POST (May 11, 2016), http://www.scmp.com
/lifestyle/article/1943505/hong-kong-still-worlds-most-connected-place-singapore-noteven-top-10 [https://perma.cc/S3TK-VTP4]. The GfK applies the Connected Consumer
Index (“CCI”), which considers “how much, and on what devices, consumers in each of
78 countries and 8 world regions digitally connect with each other and with digital
content.” See Claudia Spadoni, Connected Consumer Index, GFK, https://connectedconsumer.gfk.com/connected-consumer-index/?no_cache=1
[https://perma.cc/UM8QVZ8X] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
48
See Press Release, GfK, Hong Kong, North America and UAE are World’s Most
“Connected” Populations (May 10, 2016), https://www.gfk.com/insights/pressrelease/hong-kong-north-america-and-uae-are-worlds-most-connected-populations
[https://perma.cc/ZHX3-LMLW].
49
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optimal framework in which to nurture competition. In 2003, the
OFTA acknowledged that “competition is neither created nor
fostered simply by the process of licensing new operators but by
the ability of new entrants to access end-users and the extent to
which the incumbent is able to constrain the development of
competition.”50 Therefore, at a time when the adoption of antitrust
legislation was not on the agenda, the government was aware that
merely facilitating the issuance of licenses to newcomers would
not suffice for the markets to work adequately. While such a
strategy would remove the most significant barrier to entry (i.e.
regulatory constraints), the market power held by the former
monopolists would allow them to erect other barriers. The most
common ways to do so would be either adopting a pricing strategy
that makes it impossible for rivals to compete, or not allowing new
entrants access to their network.51
As a consequence of these concerns, in 1995, at the very outset
of the liberalization process (and before the introduction of
competition rules in the TO), basic operator-specific competition
rules were inserted into the General Conditions (“GCs”) of the
FTNS licenses issued to fixed line service providers.52 The GCs
included relatively standard prohibitions of both anti-competitive
conduct by non-dominant licensees (including collusion and
tying)53 and abuses of dominance.54 But the licenses went further
and effectively regulated the accounting55 and pricing policies56 of
dominant firms. They would, inter alia, need to seek prior
50

OFFICE OF THE TELECOMMUMINCATIONS AUTHORITY, supra note 7, at 5.
One of the allegations most frequently met by monopolists is that “in order to
protect a profitable position, [they] may erect barriers that prevent new entrants coming
into the market . . . .” SANDRA MARCO COLINO, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EU AND UK
303 (8th ed. 2019).
52
Directions Issued Under Licenses–FTNS/Fixed Carrier Licenses, OFF. TELECOMM.
AUTH., http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/ta-directions/ta-directions-ftns.html
[https://
perma.cc/34L7-R4AY] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (archiving the relevant FTNS licenses);
see also Cheng, supra note 5, at 505.
53
Cheng, supra note 5, at 505; see also, Lui, supra note 8, at 9.
54
Cheng, supra note 5, at 505.
55
See, e.g., Telecomm. Auth. Direction to H.K. Tel. Co., DR-07/1995 (June 29, 1995),
https://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/ta-directions/ta-directions-ftns.html [https://perma.cc
/96CY-CG7B] (exemplifying operation of GC 17).
56
Cheng, supra note 5, at 505.
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approval to implement discounts, which would otherwise be
prohibited.57 The aim of such a rule was precisely that former
monopolists would not be able to prevent market entry by setting
prices at a level that would make it difficult, if not impossible, for
newcomers to flourish.58 Dominant companies would also be
precluded from giving and receiving unfair advantages to and from
associates, so as to ensure that providers needing to use networks
controlled by the former monopolists would have access to these
on the same conditions as their affiliates, without experiencing
exclusionary discrimination.59 There provisions were fundamental
since, as Cliff Lui has noted, “[w]ithout the force of law or
authority, the incumbent would have used all resources necessary
to eradicate new competing firms fighting for pieces of its profits
pie.”60 Licensees holding a dominant position, which felt that their
dominance had all but vanished, could request a review of their
classification.61 If successful, they would no longer have to comply
with the specific obligations attached to dominance.
These rules constitute the first attempt to introduce boundaries
on the freedom of market operators in order to protect competition
in Hong Kong. It is interesting that, in a jurisdiction so reluctant to
the adoption of antitrust legislation, the restrictions imposed on
dominant undertakings in the GCs are significantly harsher than
those that would normally be imposed under modern competition
law systems. They respond to the rationale that the market power
of dominant players in previously regulated network industries

57

Cheng, supra note 5, at 505; see also, Lui, supra note 8, at 9.
Ling Ping & Edward Chen, Competition Policy Under Laissez-faireism: Market
Power and Its Treatment in Hong Kong, 21 REV. INDUS. ORG. 145, 148, 150 (2002).
59
For an analysis of the extent to which exclusionary discrimination should be
considered abusive and unlawful, see Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Exclusionary Discrimination
under Article 102 TFEU, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 141 (2014).
60
Lui, supra note 8, at 8.
61
GC 44. See, e.g., Gracie Foo, Direction Issued under Fixed Telecommunications
Network Services License General Condition 44 to H.K. Cable Television Ltd., DR48/2004, TELECOMM. AUTH. (Aug. 20, 2004), https://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/tadirections/dir20040820.pdf https://perma.cc/LQW4-E2VQ (exemplifying operation of
GC 44).
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needs to be not just controlled, but actively undermined.62 In the
Guidelines to Assist the Interpretation and Application of the
Competition Provisions of the FTNS License, issued by the OFTA
in 1995,63 it seems that the government attempts to downplay the
relevance and intrusiveness of the rules, specifying that the GCs
were to be interpreted as a standard of conduct and not as
comprehensive competition or consumer protection regulation.
However, it is evident that they follow the logic of modern
antitrust regimes. This suggests that the awareness of the pressing
need to regulate competition existed even in the 1990s, despite the
assiduous denial of its significance in other sectors. Unfortunately,
the GCs were not just specific to the telecoms industry, but
addressed to particular licensees only. Their scope was thus
extremely limited.
C. The Shortcomings of Fostering Competition
Through Regulation
In view of the impact of liberalization on Hong Kong’s
telecoms markets, explored above,64 it is understandable that the
government would take pride in the achievements of the process. It
has not been shy to take credit for its role in fostering competitive
market structures. By way of example, in 2003, when commenting
on the swift expansion of the new entrants, an OFTA spokesperson
was quoted as saying that it was “the result of our liberalization
policy and pro-competition regulations.”65 In addition to the
growth of new market players, additional achievements are
frequently cited to illustrate just how competitive the telecoms
industry is. Penetration rates are among the highest in the world,

62

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, EU Competition Law in the Regulated Network Industries, in
INTERSECTIONS OF ANTITRUST: POLICY AND REGULATION (Jonathan Galloway ed.,
forthcoming 2019).
63
Guidelines to Assist the Interpretation and Application of the Competition
Provisions of the FTNS Licence, GN-01/1995, OFF. TELECOM. AUTH. (June 1995), https://
tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/report-paper-guide/guidance-notes/in95f211.html
[https://perma.cc/NT8A-NHFM].
64
See supra Section I.A.
65
Press Release, H.K. Gov’t, Study Finds Hong Kong a Competitive
Telecommunications Market (June 20, 2003), http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general
/brandhk/0620245.htm [https://perma.cc/BJG7-4EC4] (emphasis added).
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and its telecoms markets are among the least expensive. Between
1996 and 2002, the cumulative savings from competition in mobile
telephony were calculated to be HKD 70 billion, while customer
savings from IDD calls from 1999 to 2001 were estimated to be
around HKD 31 billion.66 Scholars have seconded the merits of the
government’s strategy. Yun Zhao, for instance, finds that the
process led to “open and effective competition, voluntary and
industry-led standards and wide consumer choices.”67
Significantly, the success is often attributed to Hong Kong’s
minimalist approach to regulation and the predominant belief that
market forces (virtually) alone are the optimal way of allocating
resources.68 As a consequence, the assumption has been that, once
the markets were opened up, competition flourished, and there was
little or no need to take any further action.
The view that the achievements referred to above are
necessarily a reflection of healthy competition is nonetheless
imprecise. As the Hong Kong Consumer Council has noted, there
appears to be a conflation of the concept of international
competitiveness with that of domestic competition,69 when they are
in fact not equivalent. International competitiveness is a fairly
broad concept that is frequently referred to but seldom defined.70 It
refers generally to the ability of a country’s firms to compete in
export markets, or against imports in their domestic market.71
According to a 1985 House of Lords Report,
[a] firm is competitive if it can produce products
and services of superior quality and lower costs than
its domestic and international competitors.
Competitiveness is synonymous with a firm’s long66

Id.
ZHAO, supra note 38, at 26.
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Ping & Chen, supra note 58, at 145.
69
CONSUMER COUNCIL, COMPETITION POLICY: THE KEY TO HONG KONG’S FUTURE
ECONOMIC SUCCESS ¶ 3.5 (1996), https://www.consumer.org.hk/sites/consumer
/files/competition_issues/199611/competitionpolicy_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV84JFSY] [hereinafter COMPETITION POLICY].
70
Jan Fagerberg, International Competitiveness, 98 ECON. J., 355, 355 (1998).
71
Nick Godfrey, Why is Competition Important for Growth and Poverty Reduction?, 7
OECD GLOB. FORUM ON INT’L INV. 1, 5 (2008), http://www.oecd.org/investment
/globalforum/40315399.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ9M-2G3R].
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run profit performance and its ability to compensate
its employees and provide superior returns to its
owners.72
Whether a region is competitive is calculated, inter alia, with
reference to a mix of macroeconomic, microeconomic, structural,
and qualitative aspects ranging from gross domestic product (GDP)
to the openness of domestic markets and the rule of law.73
Domestic competition, on its part, is a crucial factor for
competitiveness.74 It is measured by issues such as the size of firms
in the markets, product substitutability, market contestability, the
existence of barriers to entry, and consumer welfare.75 As Ping and
Chen have highlighted, “[w]hile Hong Kong is truly competitive in
international markets in terms of exports and the ability to attract
foreign investment, this competitiveness does not mean, nor does it
ensure, that competition exists among firms in domestic
markets.”76
In this sense, Hong Kong may have been a victim of its own
success, and the acceptable levels of competitiveness may have
eclipsed the resilient obstacles that dampen competition in its
domestic telecoms markets. Even more importantly, the
assumptions made about the operation of Hong Kong’s
telecommunications markets appear to obviate the basic premise
that a specific market structure is not always a valid indicator of
the level of competition in that market. Competition is not an end
in itself, but a means to achieve other goals, including efficiency.
A monopolistic market structure is certainly inferior to a model of
perfect competition.77 Yet even in the absence of concentration, the
72

SELECT COMMITTEE ON OVERSEAS TRADE, REPORT, 1984-85, HL 238-I, at 468 (UK).
CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 23; see also Peter J. Buckley, Christopher L.
Pass & Kate Prescott, Measures of International Competitiveness: A Critical Survey, 4 J.
OF MKTG. MGMT. 175–200 (1988).
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Issue Note, UNCTAD Secretariat, The Relationship Between Competition,
Competitiveness and Development, U.N. Issue Note TD/B/COM.2/CLP/30, at 4 (May
23, 2002) http://unctad.org/Sections/ditc_ccpb/docs/ditc_ccpb0020_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7PPW-37LZ]; see also Godfrey, supra note 71, at 5.
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CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 23.
76
Ping & Chen, supra note 58, at 146.
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behavior of the participants may stifle the process that antitrust
laws were designed to protect. The link between perfect and actual
competition was an idea defended by Neoclassical economics,78
but more recent, elaborate theories and extensive evidence show
that placing the focus of antitrust intervention solely on market
structure is not sufficient. While some market structures lend
themselves to anti-competitive behavior, and require special
attention, it is possible that firms behave anti-competitively in
virtually every market scenario. Market competition should instead
be understood as a dynamic process affected by multiple factors,
one of which is the configuration of the market.79
As a consequence of the above, while the structure of Hong
Kong’s main telecommunications markets (with the notable
exception of data access) is healthy, this does not imply that those
markets are free from all ills, nor that competition is necessarily
stark. The existence of a desirable market structure is not enough
to guarantee competition, as demonstrated by some of the issues
that have come to light post-liberalization, discussed in the next
section.80 The regulatory changes that opened up the markets and
put pressure on the incumbents to compete fairly managed to level
the playing field, but that field needs to be adequately cared for to
reap the expected fruits of strong competition. For this purpose, the
adoption of antitrust legislation is paramount.

78

See, e.g., AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF
(A.M. Kelley Publishers 1838). For an overview of Neoclassical
economics, see Tony Lawson, What is This ‘School’ Called Neoclassical Economics?, 37
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 947, 947 (2013).
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See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1921).
For an analysis from a Hong Kong perspective, see generally KUI-WAI LI, ECONOMIC
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See infra Section III.C.
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II. THE BOUNDARIES OF SECTOR-SPECIFIC COMPETITION LAW
A. The Consumer Council’s (Unheeded) Efforts to Spur the
Adoption of Competition Law
Competition has long been considered “instrumental to the
rapid development of the local telecom market.”81 Giving
customers a choice of service providers, it was believed, would
encourage competing firms to act more efficiently, reduce prices,
enhance innovation, and improve service quality.82 Coinciding
with the time when the seed of the liberalization process was
planted, and despite the prevailing partiality towards laissezfaireism, the debate as to whether competition law should be
adopted in Hong Kong was gaining momentum. In 1992, Chris
Patten, the last British Governor of Hong Kong, insisted that both
the Consumer Council and the Legislative Council (LegCo) ought
to help the government to “defend free markets and to give
consumers the full redress against unscrupulous business practices
to which they are entitled.”83
Indeed, the Hong Kong Consumer Council was instrumental in
shedding light on the problems related to the lack of competition in
Hong Kong’s markets and in putting pressure on the government to
take action. In the early 1990s, it conducted a series of studies—
one of which focused on telecommunications—which showed the
poor intensity of competition in various sectors of the local
economy.84 In 1996, it published the report “Competition Policy:
The Key to Hong Kong’s Future Success” (the 1996 Report).85
Inter alia, it highlighted that Hong Kong’s strong performance
could not be taken for granted, since growing international
pressure increasingly threatened its competitive edge.86 It also
found that maintaining a monopoly on international calls as a

81

Lui, supra note 8, at 4.
Id.
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Official Record of Proceedings, H.K. LEG. COUNCIL 16 (Oct. 7, 1992),
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consequence of HKTI’s exclusive license (which would be
revoked three years later) was contradictory with the general trend
of opening up the markets.87 By the time the 1996 Report was
published, services had overtaken manufacturing to become the
major economic activity of the city, and the export of services was
viewed as fundamental for the economic growth of Hong Kong.88
While the government, already committed to liberalizing the
industry, had vowed to ensure that service markets remain open
and highly competitive, the absence of intervention would not
work for all markets. In particular, in the case of utilities,
international competition was hampered by the fact that they were
provided locally. The main conclusion was that “Hong Kong must
map out a pragmatic development strategy in which a
comprehensive competition policy should play a vital part.”89 The
Consumer Council ultimately advocated for the adoption of crosssector comprehensive competition legislation and the creation of
an authority with the power to investigate potential breaches of the
law.90
The government’s reaction to the study came only a year after
the publication of the 1996 Report, in the shape of the creation of a
Competition Policy Advisory Group (“COMPAG”) to assess the
recommendations put forward by the Consumer Council.91 Rather
disappointingly, in May 1998, the COMPAG issued a formal
policy statement saying that, rather than introducing a general
competition law, the government would opt for continuing to focus
on sector-specific competition policy.92 A general ban on anticompetitive practices, according to the COMPAG, would be an
“overkill,” and the creation of an antitrust agency would only lead
to the duplication of regulatory bodies.93 The COMPAG further
claimed that cross-sector competition law would not deal with the
peculiarities of each industry.94 As a consequence, it announced
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

See supra Section I.A.
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that different rules for different sectors would be enacted, to be
enforced by sector-specific bodies.95 This was the context in which
competition provisions were added to the TO and included in the
BO when it was enacted. Unfortunately, until 2015, they remained
the only two sectors vested with antitrust rules. While this
development dealt a blow to the proposals of the Consumer
Council, and to those advocating for competition law in Hong
Kong, it was an important step forward in the path towards the
adoption of cross-sector legislation.
B. The Substantive Provisions of the
Telecommunications Ordinance
The TO’s main substantive antitrust provisions, applicable to
telecoms licensees, came into force in June 2000 in the shape of
Sections 7I to 7N.96 They were accompanied by new procedural
rules so as to enable their enforcement: Sections 32N to 32R dealt
with appeals,97 Section 35A conferred on the TA investigatory
powers,98 and Section 36C contained the relevant penalties.99
Mergers in the sector remained free from scrutiny until July 2004,
when Section 7P, introduced by the Telecoms (Amendment)
Ordinance 2003, became applicable.
Essentially, the provisions added to the TO did little else than
extend to the entire telecoms industry the rules contained in the
GCs of the FTNS licenses, discussed in the previous section.100
Anticompetitive joint conduct was covered in Section 7K, which
prohibited licensees in telecoms markets from engaging in conduct
with “the purpose or effect of preventing or substantially
restricting competition.”101 The second paragraph of the provision
contained a non-exhaustive list of the circumstances that would be
taken into account when assessing the legality of a conduct. It
included the ubiquitous references to price fixing, refusals to
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
See Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7I-N (H.K.).
See id. at §32.
See id. at §35.
See id. at §36.
See supra Section I.B.
Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K(1) (H.K.).

952

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:931

supply competitors, and market sharing arrangements, plus a
general clause allowing the assessment of the conditions of the
relevant licenses.102 Section 7K(3) specified the kind of conduct
that would be forbidden, mentioning three categories: any
“agreement, arrangement or
understanding” with an
anticompetitive purpose or effect; exclusive agreements imposing
obligations not to acquire from others;103 and giving or receiving
unfair advantages to or from associates, to the detriment of
competitors.104 This last category was invoked in the 2003 Banyan
Garden Estate case, discussed below.105
Section 7L forbids the abuse of dominance on the part of
telecoms licensees.106 A rather loose definition of what constitutes
a dominant position can be found in the second paragraph of the
prohibition, which is described as the ability of a licensee to act
“without significant competitive restraint from its competitors and
customers.”107 Whether a company is dominant is to be determined
by considering, inter alia, the licensee’s market share, its power to
make pricing decisions, the existence of barriers to entry in the
market, and the degree of product differentiation.108 Abuse was
defined as “conduct which has the purpose or effect of preventing
or substantially restricting competition in a telecommunications
market.”109 Specific forms of abuse would include predatory
pricing, price discrimination (that is, price differences that are not
justified by actual or likely differences in the supply costs), the
imposition of harsh contractual terms or terms unrelated to the
subject of the contract, tying arrangements, and discrimination in
the supply of services to competitors.110 Section 7N refers to
various forms of discrimination that will be considered abusive
when carried out by a dominant licensee,111 but only where the TA
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at § 7K(2).
Unless the TA has given written authorization for such an arrangement.
Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K(3) (H.K.).
See infra Section II.C.
Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7L(1) (H.K.).
Id. at § 7L(2).
Id. at § 7L(3).
Id. at § 7L(4).
Id. at § 7L(5).
Id. at § 7N(1), (2).
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finds that there is an anticompetitive purpose or effect.112
Discrimination, in the context of the application of the TO, can be
in relation to charges (unless they reflect cost), performance
characteristics, or other terms or conditions of supply.113
By virtue of Section 7P of the TO, the TA also had the power
to oversee mergers affecting carrier licenses. The test adopted was
whether the merger would tend to substantially lessen competition
(“SLC”),114 employed in jurisdictions such as the UK, US, or other
parts of the world.115 Like in UK merger control, notification was
not compulsory under the TO, but consent could be sought by the
affected licensee or any interested person.116 Regardless of whether
a merger had been notified, in the event that the TA believed that
an SLC could occur, it had the power to issue a written notice
asking the licensee to take such action as it considered necessary
“to eliminate or avoid any such effect.”117 An exception was
provided for those concentrations which could result in efficiencies
that would outweigh any potential detrimental consequences.118
After considering the concentration and giving the interested
parties a reasonable opportunity to make representations,119 if the
concerns still persisted and no countervailing efficiencies were
identified, the TA could refuse consent or make consent
conditional upon the adoption of specified remedies targeted at
eliminating the SLC.

112
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Standard, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 293, 296 (2005) (discussing the SLC test, inter alia);
Ioannis Kokkoris, Do Merger Stimulation and Critical Loss Analysis Differ under the
SLC and Dominance Test?, 27 EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REV. 249, 250 (2005).
116
Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K(1) (H.K.);
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C. The Limitations of the Sectoral Antitrust System
In principle, if adequately enforced, the scope of the TO’s
antitrust and merger review clauses would have been apt for
attacking a wide range of anti-competitive practices and for
preventing concentrations that could pose a threat to competition.
Their effectiveness would have been limited to telecoms markets,
yet within those sectoral boundaries, they could have been used to
protect the hard-earned competitive environment in the sector. A
robust industry-specific competition policy could also have served
to showcase the benefits of applying antitrust to combat anticompetitive conduct, which could have proved crucial at a time of
prevailing skepticism towards such regulation. Regrettably,
important procedural and practical limitations, discussed here,
drastically reduced the significance of the regime.
The penalties for breaches of the competition law provisions
are disappointing for a number of reasons. First, most cases were
resolved with a mere warning letter or a direction, which would in
effect amount to nothing more than a cease-and-desist order
requiring the companies in breach of the rules to put an end to the
alleged violation. Such lax consequences would hardly have had
any deterrent effect, and they would not be sufficient to restore
competition and/or fix the damage caused by anticompetitive
behavior. While financial penalties were contemplated in the TO,
they were reserved for serious breaches and were usually capped at
a modest HKD 200,000 for first-time wrongdoers, which could be
increased up to a maximum of HKD 1 million in the event of
recidivism.120 As the author has argued elsewhere, a fixed
maximum penalty does not affect all companies equally, and the
excessive predictability invites strategic behavior as to whether it
is profitable to breach the law.121 Moreover, the TO’s fixed fines
were too low to be threatening to those “making substantial profits
from cartel activity.”122 Harsher fines based on turnover and
sanctions such as the suspension of the license were reserved for
120
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the most serious breaches and never applied in practice.123 A
second issue was the late adoption of merger control. No merger
was ever blocked, and the scarce analysis of the concentrations that
took place before the entry into force of the CO would not have
been sufficient to effectively identify anticompetitive harm.124
Third, the Consumer Council and commentators insisted on the
weaknesses intrinsic to the nature of the sectoral approach.
According to the Consumer Council, the resulting approach would
be “piece meal” and could lead to inconsistencies if the different
regulators reached different outcomes in similar investigations.
Moreover, contrary to the government’s claims, Lin and Chen
argued that it would be inadequate to have regulatory bodies take
on the additional role of antitrust enforcers, as this would require
them to perform dual roles and would force them to judge
complaints relating to the companies they themselves regulated.
They further insisted on the potential negative consequences of the
rules “on the efficient allocation of resources across different
sectors of the economy,” given that private actors’ investment
decisions take into account the “institutional costs” of being active
in specific markets.125
Fourth, beyond the limitations of the law, an even more
significant obstacle for the effectiveness of the sector-specific
competition law provisions was the absence of enforcement
initiative on the part of the TA to take action against
anticompetitive conduct. In 2002, Lin and Chen assessed the cases
completed by the TA, in which the GCs of the FTNS licenses
and/or the TO had come into play.126 In the very few examples that
had arisen, the TA had seldom acted on its own volition and
mainly limited himself to acting “as a referee in resolving
complaints” from consumers, competitors, or the Consumer
Council.127 As outsiders to the allegedly illegal activity, it was
often difficult for those parties to meet the standard of proof

123
124
125
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Ping & Chen, supra note 58, at 150.
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required to show that an infringement had taken place.128
Moreover, the lack of competition culture in the city made it
difficult for victims of anti-competitive conduct to identify the
illegality of the actions that could be affecting them in their daily
lives and having a significant impact on their welfare.129
The passive role of the TA was perhaps most noticeable when
it came to tackling the most significant suspected violations of the
sector-specific competition rules, with three particularly notorious
examples. The first was a case of price fixing between
competitors.130 In January 2000 (only months prior to the entry
into force of the competition law provisions of the TA), all
licensed mobile telephone operators individually announced a
twenty to twenty-five percent price increase in the subscription
fees for all of their major service plans, which would take effect on
the same day.131 Contrary to what the GCs of their licenses
required, the TA had not been notified of the price increase in
advance.132 According to the service providers, their actions did
not amount to collusion, as they were simply attempting to make
up for the losses they had been experiencing since 1999.133 They
did admit, however, that representatives from their companies had
met to discuss common concerns in the months immediately before
the price hike, and they did touch upon the issue of passing the
license fee to customers.134 While the TA came to the conclusion
that “some kind of arrangement between the companies with
regard to their prices must have existed,” no penalties were
imposed, given that they all agreed to modify their conduct to
ensure that they complied with their obligations.135 The lenient
response to what is generally accepted to be the most harmful kind
of anticompetitive conduct was highly unsatisfactory and would in
no way have served to deter collusive practices.136
128
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130
131
132
133
134
135
136
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The second case was the implementation of what may possibly
have amounted to abusive bundling in Banyan Garden Estate,
decided in 2003.137 Bayan Garden Estate is a housing complex in
the city’s Kowloon district, developed by Cheung Kong (Holdings)
Limited (CKH).138 Its residents complained that Citybase, the
estate’s management company, had included in the (compulsory)
monthly management fee the cost of telephone and Internet
services to be provided by Hutchison Multimedia, HGCL, and
PowerCom—all subsidiaries of the property developer, who also
owned Citybase.139 Resorting to the services of an alternative
operator would have led to payment in addition to the management
fee.140 The case was brought before the TA, citing an advantage
given to affiliates that violated Section 7K(3)(c) TO by restricting
the residents’ freedom to resort to alternative operators.141 Citybase
claimed that there had been a bidding process for the provision of
the Internet services,142 as a consequence of which the providers
had been selected. The TA concluded that this process was not
unfair (a requirement for the provision at stake to be applicable),
since the favored telecoms operators “had no apparent knowledge
that they were being advantaged, and had either acted
competitively for the right to be selected or were recommended by
an unrelated third party.”143 The focus of the analysis of these
practices is entirely flawed. As Cheng has noted, the economic
impact was completely overlooked, and the intention and actual
harm were not taken into consideration.144 The lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the TA to scrutinize the real estate market precluded
a full analysis of the possibly unlawful bundling.145
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The problems in the residential broadband market endured. In
May 2007, the OFTA published the results of a survey it conducted
on consumer satisfaction with home broadband services, after
receiving over 4,000 complaints.146 The survey reflected that sixtytwo percent of respondents had experienced problems with their
service in the previous 12 months.147 They cited reliability,
connection speed, and customer services as the most significant
issues.148 In its statement, the OFTA placed the emphasis on the
need for greater transparency and consumer information.149 No
mention was made of the possible link between these issues and
the level of competition in the market.150 Many customers, for
instance, did not have a choice, not as a result of a lack of
information, but because their properties had been fitted with the
infrastructure to connect to only one residential broadband
provider that was owned by the property developer.151 This once
again reflects the insufficiencies of the industry-specific legislation
in a city dominated by tycoons who control powerful
conglomerates in multiple sectors of the economy.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ADOPTION OF CROSS-SECTOR
COMPETITION ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
By the late 2000s, Hong Kong’s resistance to cross-sector
competition law had become an anachronism. In 2008, there were
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already 111 competition law regimes in the world.152 China’s first
antitrust legislation, the Anti-Monopoly Law, came into force in
August that year, marking the “symbolic commencement of a new
era of competition for China.”153 Yet, in Hong Kong, the
Consumer Council’s efforts remained unheeded during the
mandate of Chee-hwa Tung, the first Chief Executive after the
Handover,154 who was well connected to the local tycoons.155 It
was in 2005, when Donald Tsang became Chief Executive, that
things took a sharp turn. Convinced of the virtues of introducing
antitrust legislation, he set up the Competition Policy Review
Committee (“CPRC”), which presented the Competition Bill in
July 2010.156
While it was initially met with strong opposition, on June 14,
2012, the CO was finally adopted by LegCo,157 and it entered into
force on December 14, 2015.158 During the implementation period,
the Hong Kong Competition Commission (“HKCC”) and the Hong
Kong Competition Tribunal (“HKCT”) were set up, six guidelines
were adopted, and two policy documents—one on leniency and
one on enforcement priorities—were published.159 The HKCC also
developed multiple competition advocacy initiatives, with a view
to educating the population about the harms of anticompetitive
conduct and to furnishing businesses with compliance
152
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information.160 In 2012, the TA and the OFTA were abolished, and
their functions were assumed by the Communications Authority
(“CA”) and the Office of the Communications Authority
(“OFCA”).161 This section covers the CO’s most important
features and explores its potential to control anticompetitive
practices in general, and in the telecommunications industry in
particular.
A. The Shape of the Antitrust Regime Laid Down in the
Competition Ordinance
The CO’s main substantive rules are in keeping with the
general principles of modern competition law regimes. They
include: a prohibition of joint conduct, which may have an
anticompetitive object or effect, enshrined in the First Conduct
Rule (“FCR”); a condemnation of abuses of market power, in the
shape of the Second Conduct Rule (“SCR”); and a Merger Rule,
which aims to control concentrations involving telecoms carrier
license holders that substantially lessen competition in Hong
Kong.162
The FCR applies to agreements, decisions by associations, or
concerted practices between undertakings with the object or effect
of preventing, distorting, or restricting competition in Hong
Kong.163 Its wording is thus very similar to that of Article 101(1)
of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)
and evidences that the European Union (“EU”) system was one of
the regimes on which the CO was modelled.164 The Guideline on
the First Conduct Rule (“Guideline FCR”), published by the
HKCC in July 2015,165 specified that both horizontal and vertical
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agreements may be caught.166 Schedule 1 CO contains some
exclusions and exemptions.167 It excludes agreements that enhance
“overall economic efficiency” and some of the conduct that may be
carried out by small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”).168
Moreover, it contains what is in effect a De Minimis rule for
agreements of “lesser significance,” by virtue of which the FCR
will not apply to arrangements where the combined turnover of the
undertakings does not exceed HKD 200 million, unless the
behavior constitutes serious anti-competitive conduct.169 This is
different from the EU De Minimis rule, which, rather than using a
fixed amount, excludes agreements that do not meet certain market
share thresholds, and is inapplicable in the case of restrictions of
competition by object.170 The only exception to the Hong Kong
exclusion is for serious anti-competitive conduct, a more limited
concept: not all restrictions by object will fall under this rubric.171
The conduct of powerful undertakings is controlled by the
SCR, which forbids abuses of a substantial degree of market power
(thereby seemingly adopting the standard of Australian and New
Zealand competition law, rather than the dominance requirement
of the EU).172 The HKCC considers market power to exist where
an undertaking is able “profitably to raise prices above the
competitive level for a sustained period.”173 With regard to what is
considered abusive conduct, Section 21 CO refers to predatory
behavior and to “limiting production, markets or technical
development to the prejudice of consumers,” which is said to
include “anti-competitive tying and bundling, refusals to deal and
exclusive dealing.”174 Unlike the EU or US regimes, which do not
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contemplate exceptions in the case of abuses, the CO refers to
various exclusions, including for services of general economic
interest and for conduct of lesser significance, applicable to
undertakings with an annual turnover of HKD forty million or
less.175 It is unusual to have a De Minimis rule for these practices,
and the adequacy of its inclusion in the CO has been questioned.176
Breaches of the FCR and the SCR can be sanctioned in various
ways, the most common of which is financial penalties of up to ten
percent of an undertaking’s local turnover for each year of
infringement, for up to a maximum of three years (which would be
the three years with the highest turnovers if the violation lasted
longer).177 The choice of local (as opposed to global) turnover and
the three year cap respond to compromises that had to be made to
get sufficient support in LegCo for the law to be passed.178
Directors can also be disqualified for up to five years,179 provided
that the illegal conduct “makes the person unfit to be concerned in
the management of a company.”180 Further penalties may be
imposed on both individuals and corporations that breach the CO’s
procedural rules during an investigation, which include fines and
even incarceration.181 It should be noted that the CO adopts a
judicial model, and, therefore, penalties are imposed by the
HKCT,182 not the HKCC.183
Currently, the telecommunications industry is the only sector
of the economy where concentrations can be controlled under the
CO, since the Merger Rule (“MR”) only applies to mergers
involving carrier licensees.184 It is possible, therefore, that a
company that is not itself active in a telecoms market may be
subject to the MR, if it is part of a conglomerate or vertical
175
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concentration involving at least one telecoms licensee. Like in the
UK or Australia, notification is voluntary, and the substantive test
used to assess a merger is whether it leads to a substantial
lessening of competition (“SLC)”.185 The Guideline on the Merger
Rule (“Guideline MR”) explains that the HKCC will consider
structural factors (“market shares, market concentration, barriers to
entry, vertical integration, buying power and import
competition”)186 as well as non-structural factors (like the
“strategic behaviour” of firms directed at altering the market
structure).187 The HKCC refers to two indices, the market
concentration ration and the HHI, as reliable indicators of the
situations in which it may decide to scrutinize a merger. Normally,
it will intervene where the CR4 (that is, the post-merger combined
market share of the four largest companies in the market) is over
seventy-five percent, and the merged firm’s market share exceeds
forty percent. It may also look at mergers where the CR4 is in
excess of seventy-five percent, and the market share of the merged
company is over fifteen percent.188 According to the Guideline
MR, markets with a post-merger HHI189 of more than 1,800 will be
considered highly concentrated, and mergers in those markets are
likely to be investigated unless the increase after the merger HHI is
less than fifty.190 In moderately concentrated markets, where the
HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, mergers may be subject to
scrutiny if they produce an increase of 100 in the HHI.191 Below
1,000, the HKCC does not expect to have to intervene, but it is
worth noting that these are only indicative safe harbors, and it may
decide to examine operations even below those thresholds.192
There is no timetable for the HKCC to provide advice, although it
vows to act in an “efficient and timely manner.”193 The remedies
that may be offered according to Section 60 CO are both structural
185
186
187
188
189
190
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and behavioral, although, where possible, the former are
preferred.194
B. The Potential of the New Rules to Address
Telecoms-Specific Problems
Any assessment of the impact of the CO is unavoidably
hampered by its very limited practical application to date. As of
August 2018, the HKCC has only brought proceedings before the
HKCT in two cartel cases, and the outcome of both is still pending.
However, the antitrust mileage of the telecoms sector at least
serves to identify the most significant threats to competition in this
industry. It is possible, therefore, to make accurate predictions as
to the potential of the new rules to address those problems.
Without a doubt, the most important improvement relates to
cartel cases. Hypothetically, before the introduction of the FCR,
Section 7K TO (and even the GCs of the licenses) could have been
used to strike down cartels. However, the seemingly evident price
fixing collusion between mobile phone operators that took place in
2000 exposed the shortcomings of relying on a sectoral regulator,
without specific antitrust expertise, as the only authority
empowered to decide on both the existence of illegal conduct and
the suitable punishment.195 By contrast, now there is a solid
institutional framework in place, with an agency and a tribunal
that, unlike the TA, specialize in competition law issues. The
executive arm of the HKCC comprises experts who have first-hand
knowledge of the application of antitrust rules in experienced
jurisdictions, including the UK, Australia, the US, France, and
Portugal. The current CEO, Brent Snyder, was Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in the Antitrust
Division of the US Department of Justice and prosecuted a
plethora of cartels before coming to Hong Kong.196 Moreover, in
both the CO and the Guideline FCR, it is crystal clear that hardcore
194
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cartels constitute serious anticompetitive conduct, considered
anticompetitive by object, and are harshly treated. The law further
specifies that the De Minimis exception will not apply. The
availability of leniency, one of the most valuable cartel detection
mechanisms, ought to assist greatly in the complex process of
gathering the necessary proof of the existence of a cartel.197 And
the practice of the HKCC thus far reflects a tough stance on
cartels. Interestingly, the first case the Commission brought before
the HKCT related to the alleged bid-rigging practices of five IT
companies. Nutanix Hong Kong Limited, BT Hong Kong Limited,
SiS International Limited, Innovix Distribution Limited, and Tech21 Systems Limited may have breached the FCR in relation to a
tender issued by the Hong Kong Young Women’s Christian
Association (“YWCA”) for the supply and installation of a new IT
server system. The bids submitted by the competitors purportedly
included “dummy” bids and may thus have amounted to bid
rigging.198
The CO ought to further allow for investigating exclusionary
bundling/tying practices in scenarios similar to the Banyan Garden
Estate case discussed above, which was so disappointingly tackled
under the previous legal framework.199 The HKCC has the power
to conduct investigations into every market, and thus the obstacle
which existed in that case—that the enforcer lacked the authority
to look into the real estate market—would be easily overcome.
Tying and bundling are expressly listed as being abusive in the
Guideline SCR, as they may enable a dominant undertaking in one
market to leverage its power into a second market where it faces
tougher competition.200 However, the Guideline SCR also makes
clear that the authority will have to show the negative effects of
such practices, since they are considered “common commercial
197
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arrangements that generally do not harm competition and often
promote competition,” even if the company in question is
powerful.201 Therefore, in addition to the existence of a substantial
degree of market power, the HKCC will need to demonstrate
foreclosure effects.202 This will require careful scrutiny of the
economic impact of the practice. Thus far, no cases or
investigations on the basis of the SCR have been announced. It is
also unclear whether the possibility of attacking tying as a
concerted practice, which is common in the US, will be
contemplated in Hong Kong, since neither the law nor the relevant
guideline mention anything in this regard.203
The insertion of the MR in the CO might be used to prevent the
creation of market power which could threaten competition in the
relevant market. However, this would only be possible if a telecom
company is involved in the operation. The logic for this regrettable
limitation to merger control in Hong Kong is difficult to grasp. As
Cheng observed in 2007 when assessing the rationale behind the
sector-specific antitrust rules applicable at the time,204 and as our
analysis in Part I of this Article showed, post-liberalization, the
telecoms markets would not appear to be affected by particular
problems, and most display a good level of competition.
Importantly, at the time of writing and almost three years after the
entry into force of the CO, no mergers had been investigated. This
is in spite of Hutchinson Telecom, the city’s second largest mobile
operator, announcing in 2017 its intention to bid for fixed line
businesses.205 In the meantime, Hutchinson’s UK subsidiary
“Three” was prevented from purchasing competitor O2 by the
European Commission.206 Of course, it could be argued that the
201

Id. ¶ 5.9, at 31.
Id. ¶¶ 5.10–5.12, at 31–32.
203
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHICAGO L.
REV. 147 (2005).
204
Cheng, supra note 5, at 524.
205
Bien Perez, Hutchinson Telecom Shares Soar on Speculation over Bidding for Its
Fixed-Line Network Business, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 18, 2017), https://
www.scmp.com/tech/enterprises/article/2103173/hutchison-telecom-shares-soarspeculation-over-bidding-its-fixed [https://perma.cc/LSY4-M2CQ].
206
European Commission Press Release IP/16/1704, Mergers: Commission prohibits
Hutchison’s proposed acquisition of Telefónica UK (May 11, 2016).
202

2019]

ANTITRUST & HONG KONG'S TELECOMMS. MARKETS

967

latter operation would entail more harm, since the merger was
horizontal, and would have likely led to the creation of a dominant
position. Yet, without a detailed assessment, it is difficult to rule
out damaging consequences for competition even in non-horizontal
mergers. It appears that, for the time being, the HKCC is devoting
most of its resources to cartel investigations. In addition, the fact
that notification is voluntary in a jurisdiction where businesses are
not used to antitrust enforcement makes it rather unlikely that
companies will decide to report their operations.
The CO does suffer from two principal general shortcomings
which are bound to affect its potential to effectively fight
anticompetitive practices in telecoms and beyond. The first is the
absence of hefty fines. In light of the profits that can be made from
the activities it punishes, the deterrent effect is likely to be
minimal, particularly for companies that operate internationally
and that only earn a modest part of their worldwide turnover in
Hong Kong. Another issue is the absence of stand-alone private
rights of action.207 This will make it very challenging for
customers and competitors of companies that behave
anticompetitively to seek damages, as they will only be able to do
so in the event that the HKCT has ruled that there has been an
infringement. The Tribunal can, however, compel companies to
pay damages on its own initiative to “any person who has suffered
loss or damage” as a consequence of the breach.208 Therefore,
provided that the HKCC takes the necessary steps to investigate
potential breaches of the CO and brings proceedings against the
infringements that it identifies before the HKCT, the negative
effects of this limitation of the law might be minimized. Thus far,
despite having received thousands of queries and complaints, only
two cartel cases have been pursued. It is hoped that enforcement
will soon pick up after these relatively uneventful warm-up years.
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CONCLUSION
When discussing the potential of competition law in network
industries, the unique antitrust history of the telecommunications
sector in Hong Kong makes for a particularly interesting case
study. By the time the first cross-sector legislation of the city was
adopted, telecom-specific antitrust rules had been in place for two
decades. They were seen as indispensable to opening up markets
that had been operating as legal monopolies until then. The
provisions designed to control the pricing and accounting strategies
of the incumbents did their job at creating a level playing field,
which would have been unattainable had they been allowed to
price excessively low or to make access to their networks unduly
onerous or altogether impossible. However, this success largely
concealed the disappointing performance of the more traditional
competition law rules when it came to putting an end to
anticompetitive conduct and preventing the accumulation of
market power through mergers. The shortcomings were in part due
to the insufficiency of the sectoral regime to address the power of
the conglomerates that dominate the city’s markets, and in part
attributable to a flawed institutional enforcement. The sectoral
regulator did not have the experience nor the means to assess the
economic impact of the practices it had to scrutinize, and, at the
same time, it found itself in the difficult position of having to
evaluate the conduct of the companies it simultaneously regulated.
The CO, Hong Kong’s first cross-sector antitrust legislation,
has the potential to tackle some of these issues. It has served to
create the HKCC, a suitably specialized, independent competition
authority with strong investigatory powers and the expertise
required to conduct the intricate analysis antitrust violations entail.
The potential to combat cartels is evidenced by the firmness with
which collusion is condemned in the law, and by the cases the
HKCC has thus far brought before the HKCT. Yet, the absence of
attempts to tackle both the abuse and the creation of market power
places a question mark on the extent to which the authority is
committed to putting up a much-needed fight against the mighty
local conglomerates that continue to stifle competition in industries
as vital as telecommunications. This is particularly noticeable in
the data access market. Overlooking the threat that excessive
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power poses for the local economy in a city where inequality is
increasing at an alarming rate would mean squandering much of
the potential of the new antitrust legislation.

